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“Doubt is our product,” announced a tobacco industry 
executive in explaining the necessity of maintaining scientific 
uncertainty about the harms of tobacco.1 One can easily say the 
same about other industries whose products and processes harm 
human health. Indeed, it is well nigh impossible to find a 
consensus about the harmfulness of any modern product or 
byproduct, so thorough has been the industry campaign to preserve 
and nurture scientific uncertainty. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court gave the skeptics a new 
forum for their efforts when it charged federal trial courts with a 
duty to guard against admission of unreliable expert scientific 
evidence in cases before them. If courts had slogans, “doubt is our 
product” wouldn’t be a bad one for many of the courts responding 
to Daubert. 
But Daubert itself is dubious, for many reasons: 
• Unintended consequences: The decision has had precisely the 
opposite effect from the one the Court said it intended, which 
was to open the courts to a wider range of admissible scientific 
evidence. 
• Embrace of junk science: Daubert has inspired a large number 
and variety of unscientific rulings, including rulings dismissing 
the reliability of animal studies and rulings requiring plaintiffs 
to show particular numerical results from epidemiological 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to 
Gerry Spann, Rena Steinzor, and Wendy Wagner for helpful comments. I am 
also grateful to David Tarr and Danielle Woods for excellent research 
assistance. 
1 BROWN & WILLIAMSON, SMOKING AND HEALTH PROPOSAL, DOC. NO. 
332506, 4 (1998), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/bw/332506.html. 
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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studies. 
• Inspired by unfounded fears: Cases applying Daubert cite 
potential for undue juror credulousness in justifying the courts’ 
“gatekeeping” role, yet empirical evidence does not support the 
courts’ fears. 
• A “lemons” problem: Courts’ branding of highly credentialed 
scientists as “unqualified” after Daubert may create a situation 
in which bad experts drive good ones out of the market for 
expert testimony. 
• Built-in bias: The “junk science” movement that has fed 
Daubert and its progeny was a pet project of the scientifically 
challenged tobacco industry. 
• Overreaching: Daubert has gone beyond a ruling about 
admissibility of expert evidence to being a quiet but effective 
way of adjusting the substantive rules of tort. 
• False modesty: Courts applying Daubert have refused to seek 
guidance in the scientific judgments of expert administrative 
agencies, explaining that the courts are not fashioners of public 
policy. 
• Codifying science: Courts have used prior legal rulings on 
admissibility to decide scientific questions about the reliability 
of expert evidence. 
• Mixed signals: Even while they use prior rulings on 
admissibility to decide current issues regarding expert 
evidence, courts insist that they are preserving the right to a 
jury trial, and conventional rules on issue preclusion, by 
deciding each case on its own terms. 
I discuss each of these unfortunate developments in turn. 
Although I lead off with Daubert, Daubert itself is not the only 
culprit in the legal developments I describe. Certainly Daubert’s 
rejection of Frye cannot be blamed for the problems I identify. 
Rather, Daubert’s encouragement of enhanced “gatekeeping” by 
lower courts with respect to expert evidence and the Court’s 
subsequent embrace of aggressive exclusion of scientific evidence 
in General Electric v. Joiner3 are, in my view, primarily 
                                                          
3 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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responsible for the problems I discuss here. 
1. Unintended Consequences 
The Court granted certiorari in Daubert to address the question 
whether the evidentiary rule of Frye v. United States,4 which held 
that expert scientific evidence was inadmissible unless based on 
methodologies generally accepted in the relevant field, had 
survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 Frye 
was widely regarded as an undue impediment to the admission of 
novel but well-grounded expert scientific evidence in the courts.6 
Thus, a victory for the plaintiffs in Daubert, who had lost below on 
account of application of the Frye rule,7 was widely expected to 
liberalize (and modernize) the rules on admitting expert scientific 
evidence in courts.8 
The plaintiffs won in Daubert, the Frye rule was undone, and 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court talked of loosening the 
straitjacket forced on by Frye and opening the courts to a wider 
range of expert scientific evidence, as contemplated by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.9 But Justice Blackmun did not stop there. In an 
attempt to aid trial courts charged with a “gatekeeping”10 function, 
                                                          
4 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
5 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1992 WL 12006442. 
6 See, e.g., Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: 
Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
Frye was also criticized for other reasons; it was difficult if not impossible, for 
example, to find a neutral way of identifying the scientific “community” 
relevant to determining “general acceptance” under Frye. See, e.g., Brief Amici 
Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science in Support of 
Petitioners at 19 & n.10, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (No. 92-102), 1992 WL 12006437. 
7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
8 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Scientific Evidence: Court May Decide When 
Jury Can Hear It, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at A5. 
9 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. 
10 Id. at 597 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to 
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he went on to offer several “general observations” about how to 
decide whether to admit expert scientific evidence.11 Such 
evidence, said Justice Blackmun, must not only be scientifically 
reliable, but also relevant to the case at hand and it must “fit” the 
facts as alleged by the party seeking to introduce the evidence.12 
To be reliable, Justice Blackmun stated that it would be helpful if, 
for example, the evidence in question was testable, had been peer-
reviewed, had been published in a scientific journal, had a low 
error rate, and (though, with the rejection of the Frye test, this final 
factor would not be dispositive) was generally accepted in the 
relevant field.13 
In his partial dissent in Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justice Stevens, agreed with the Court’s rejection of the 
Frye standard, but he criticized the majority for going on to offer 
its “general observations” on admitting expert scientific 
evidence.14 He worried that the majority’s comments, however 
well intentioned, might come back to haunt the Court because they 
were offered in a case in which the issues and problems they might 
raise were not concretely presented.15 Indeed, that is precisely what 
has happened. The “general observations” of Daubert have, in 
practical importance, completely overwhelmed the Court’s formal 
holding regarding Frye. The Court’s casually offered guidelines on 
admitting expert scientific evidence have served as the vehicle for 
transforming Daubert from an evidence-liberalizing decision into 
an evidence-narrowing one.16 
Even so, a generous portion of the fault for transforming the 
                                                          
the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a 
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”). 
11 See id. at 593. 
12 Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3rd 
Cir. 1985)). 
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
14 Id. at 598. 
15 Id. at 598-601. 
16 See, e.g., THE PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(SKAPP), DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL CASE YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 
(2003) [hereinafter SKAPP REPORT], available at http//www.defending 
science.org/public_health_regulations/Scholarship-Additional-Articles.cfm. 
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“general observations” of Daubert into quite rigid and restrictive 
rules on admitting expert scientific evidence must be attributed to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist himself. In the Supreme Court’s first 
major case applying Daubert, Rehnquist, now writing for the 
Court, upheld the exclusion of epidemiological and animal studies 
in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that his lung cancer had 
been caused by exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).17 
Here again, the decision was, technically, about one important 
though discrete legal question, regarding the standard of review of 
district court judgments on admissibility of expert scientific 
evidence.18 Yet, much of the decision’s influence has come, again, 
from the Court’s “general observations” on admissibility. 
Specifically, after deciding that district court judgments on the 
admissibility of expert scientific evidence were to be reviewed 
under the forgiving “abuse of discretion” standard, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist went on to describe why he thought the district court’s 
ruling excluding the plaintiff’s epidemiological and animal studies 
was not an abuse of discretion.19 
With respect to the epidemiological studies, Rehnquist 
examined them one by one, and for each he found a flaw that, he 
concluded, rendered the study so unreliable as to justify the district 
court’s exclusion of it as evidence. One study did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between PCBs and disease;20 
another study involved a population that had been exposed to other 
chemicals in addition to PCBs;21 and another failed to find a 
statistically significant relationship between lung cancer and 
exposure to PCBs.22 In each case, a single flaw or shortcoming was 
enough to doom the study, and after looking at each study in 
isolation from the other, the Court wound up condoning the 
exclusion of the entire group of studies purporting to show a link 
between PCBs and cancer. 
                                                          
17 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
18 Id. at 141-42. 
19 Id. at 144-47. 
20 Id. at 145. 
21 Id. at 146. 
22 Id. at 145. 
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Regarding the animal studies, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed 
to find it awkward in the extreme that the animals in the studies 
were infant rodents, while plaintiff was an adult human.23 Thus, 
the animal studies failed to satisfy the requirement that expert 
evidence fit the facts of the case.24 Rehnquist also thought it 
relevant, and unfavorable to the admissibility of the animal studies, 
that the rodents in the studies had been given high doses of PCBs 
through a route different from the one by which the plaintiff 
himself was exposed.25 
In dissent, Justice Stevens chided the majority for making the 
mistake of Daubert; he would have rested with the decision on the 
general question presented (concerning the standard of review for 
trial courts’ decisions on admissibility) and omitted discussion of 
the specific factors relevant to the admissibility determination in 
this case.26 He thought the Court’s observations on the 
epidemiological and animal evidence were imprudent, and 
intimated they might stifle admission of well-grounded but 
imperfect scientific evidence in the lower courts.27 In Joiner, 
therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to have forgotten the 
lessons of judicial restraint that he tried to impart in his dissent in 
Daubert. 
2. Embrace of Junk Science 
In another unfortunate twist, the majority opinion in Joiner, in 
the very act of modeling an analysis of whether to admit particular 
expert scientific evidence, acted contrary to the well-established 
practices of the scientific community in exploring the implications 
of epidemiological evidence and animal studies. The Court’s 
isolation of each separate epidemiological study28 and its 
affirmation of the exclusion of each study based on minor flaws or 
                                                          
23 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 150-51 (Stevens, J. dissenting in part). 
27 See id. at 152-54. 
28 See id. at 145-47. 
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shortcomings go completely against the grain of the “weight of the 
evidence” approach favored by actual scientists.29 In their daily 
work, scientists involved in the kinds of studies rejected in Joiner 
look at the studies as a group, trying to assess their collective 
meaning, rather than fixing on one study at a time.30 Any 
epidemiologist or toxicologist will tell you that any 
epidemiological or animal study will have flaws and/or will signal 
a conclusion with imperfect clarity. But epidemiologists and 
toxicologists do not accordingly reject all of the studies produced 
by their disciplines. In singling out each study for separate 
examination, and in rejecting each one for being flawed in some 
respect, the Court in Joiner indulged in what Professor Thomas 
McGarity has called the “corpuscular” approach to scientific 
evidence and thereby parted company with the scientific 
disciplines it was purporting to follow.31 
The divergence between the law created by Daubert and actual 
scientific practice is also evident in lower court rulings following 
Daubert and Joiner. Stepping onto the trail marked by Joiner, 
many lower courts have become highly suspicious of animal 
studies and the scientific practices associated with them.32 Never 
mind that animal studies help form the backbone of the agency 
regulatory system that covers some of the very industries—in 
                                                          
29 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J. dissenting in part). 
30 See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary 
Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382, 
1384 (Sept. 18, 2002). 
31 See generally, Thomas O. McGarity, Science in the Regulatory Process: 
On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 172-76 (2003) [hereinafter McGarity, Science in the 
Regulatory Process]; Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and 
Their Science is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding 
Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 
52 KAN. L. REV. 897, 921-23 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, Our Science is 
Sound Science]. 
32 See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th 
Cir. 2002); Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996); Barrett 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 1996); Caraker v. Sandoz 
Pharm., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1036-37 (S.D. Ill. 2001). 
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particular, the pharmaceutical industry—that argue, in tort cases, 
that animal studies are so unreliable as to be inadmissible.33 And 
never mind that animal studies are widely accepted in the scientific 
community as relevant indicators of effects on humans,34 a fact 
that, in the old, supposedly too-strict Frye days, would have been 
sufficient to allow such studies into court. Despite these obvious 
tensions, courts have happily excluded evidence from animal 
studies post-Daubert. 
At the same time, courts have questioned the scientific 
practices that have been used to translate the results of animal 
studies into predictions about effects on human health. The most 
important example here is the courts’ treatment of the linear, no-
threshold dose-response model, which posits that adverse reactions 
will appear in direct proportion to exposure to the substance in 
question and that adverse reactions will occur at any exposure level 
above zero. Some courts have been remarkably dismissive of this 
model, labeling it “merely an hypothesis”35 or a “guess.”36 These 
courts seem unaware of the large volume of scientific evidence 
validating this dose-response model for use in scientific studies;37 
indeed, one court has even asserted erroneously that “to the extent 
the model has been subjected to peer review and publication, it has 
been rejected by the overwhelming majority of the scientific 
                                                          
33 New drugs are tested in pre-clinical studies on animals before they are 
tried on humans. See, e.g., Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to Those Most in 
Need: The FDA’s Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 121, 126 (1997). 
34 For general discussion, see Carl F. Cranor, The Dual Legacy of Daubert 
v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical: Trading Junk Science for Insidious Science, in 
RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (Rena Steinzor & Wendy Wagner, eds., 
Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the author). 
35 Sutera v. The Perrier Group, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 667 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(citing Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 25 (D. Mass. 1995)). 
36 Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Mass. 1995). 
37 For discussion, see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: 
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 112-115 
(The New Press 2004). 
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community.”38 
In another unscientific spin-off from Daubert and Joiner, many 
cases have rejected epidemiological studies that show a “relative 
risk” of less than 2.0, that is, studies indicating that the risk in the 
population exposed to the substance of concern is less than twice 
the risk in the unexposed population.39 Courts in these cases have 
reasoned that without studies showing relative risk of greater than 
2.0, plaintiffs bearing the “more probable than not” burden of 
proof in civil cases cannot possibly prove their cases. The courts 
reason that only if the relevant exposures have more than doubled 
the plaintiffs’ risk of harm can the plaintiffs prove that it is more 
likely than not that the exposures caused their harm.40 Scientists, 
however, do not behave in this way. They realize, for example, that 
a relative risk of less than 2.0, found in a single epidemiological 
study, might be augmented by findings of larger relative risks in 
other epidemiological studies or by sustained findings of exposure-
disease links in animal studies.41 They also recognize that many 
epidemiological studies are done in workplace settings, where the 
generally superior health status of the working population as 
compared to the population as a whole (the so-called “healthy 
worker effect”) might lead studies to underestimate the risk that 
would be found in the general population.42 The short of the matter 
                                                          
38 Whiting, 891 F. Supp. at 25. 
39 See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 
(11th Cir. 1999); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. 
Supp.2d 584, 606 (D.N.J. 2002); Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813 at *8 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Breast Implant Litigation, 
11 F. Supp.2d 1217, 1226-27 (D. Co. 1998). 
40 Several courts have taken their cue in this regard from law professor 
Michael Green’s “Reference Guide on Epidemiology,” written for the Federal 
Judicial Center, which states that “the threshold for concluding that an agent was 
more likely than not the cause of an individual’s disease is a relative risk greater 
than 2.0.” MICHAEL D. GREEN, REFERENCE GUIDE ON EPIDEMIOLOGY 384 
(2000). 
41 SKAPP REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-10. 
42 See, e.g., Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk 
Greater Than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 
JURIMETRICS J. 195, 200-01 (2001). 
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is that scientists would not, as some courts have, rule out reliance 
on an epidemiological study simply because the study failed to find 
a relative risk of greater than 2.0.43 
3. Inspired by Unfounded Fears 
Why have courts become so stingy about admitting expert 
scientific evidence? Without citation or explanation, some courts 
have justified their enlarged “gatekeeping” function by pointing to 
the likelihood that juries will be overly swayed by expert evidence 
finding a link between a substance or product and an increased risk 
of disease.44 Jurors will, the theory goes, give in too easily to the 
temptations of “junk science,” and thus judges must bar the door to 
unreliable science in order to save the civil legal system from the 
irrational fears of the jury. 
But there is no credible empirical evidence that jurors will in 
fact be so swayed.45 Indeed, the evidence that does exist on the 
mindset and perceptions of jurors points, if anything, in the 
opposite direction. Jurors, on average, are highly skeptical of 
plaintiffs’ claims in personal injury cases and subject plaintiffs to 
greater scrutiny than corporate defendants.46 They come inclined to 
look for a way in which injured victims could be at fault for their 
                                                          
43 For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Cranor, supra note 34. 
44 See, e.g., Whiting, 891 F. Supp. at 24 (“This [gatekeeping] role is 
especially sensitive in cases ‘where the plaintiff claims that exposure to a toxic 
substance caused his injury, [because a] jury may blindly accept an expert’s 
opinion that conforms with their underlying fears of toxic substances without 
carefully understanding or examining the basis for that opinion.’”) (citing 
O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (C.D. Ill. 
1992)); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 960 (E.D. Ark. 1998). 
45 See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An 
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 863-66 (1998); Valerie P. Hans & 
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOC. MAG. DEL. TRIAL LAW. 
17 (1994). 
46 Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business 
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 93 (1992). 
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own injuries.47 They come with a favorable impression of the 
corporate entities that often are the defendants in cases involving 
Daubert.48 In their effort to shield juries from expert scientific 
evidence they believe will cause them undue alarm, courts have 
ignored empirical evidence indicating that their own fears are 
unwarranted. Indeed, jury researcher Valerie Hans has concluded 
there is “no evidence that juries in business cases reach verdicts 
that are disproportionately at odds with judicial views.”49 
4. A “Lemons” Problem 
At the same time courts have been anxious, after Daubert, to 
scrutinize expert scientific evidence so that they do not admit “junk 
science” into the courtroom, they have also begun to frame their 
opinions on admissibility in such a way as to create disincentives 
for truly neutral and well-credentialed experts to become involved 
in litigation. In a striking development, courts have ruled that the 
experts who offer evidence the courts deem unreliable under 
Daubert are themselves not qualified to testify.50 Thus we have the 
spectacle of courts declaring that reputable, well-credentialed 
scientists are “not qualified” to offer the expert opinions they are 
presenting.51 
In framing their decisions in terms of the qualifications of the 
expert rather than the reliability of the expert’s testimony, courts 
risk branding top-notch scientists as something like charlatans, 
                                                          
47 Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business 
Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE 242 (1990); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY 
INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995). 
48 Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of 
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998). 
49 Id. at 341. 
50 See, e.g., Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1997); Sutera 
v. The Perrier Group, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 667 (D. Mass. 1997); Diaz v. 
Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 372-74 (D.N.J. 1995). 
51 See generally, Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 743, 757-73 (1999) (compiling cases in which a determination of 
expert qualification has been made). 
HEINZERLING MACROED.DOC 4/25/2006  11:00 PM 
76 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
pretending to have knowledge they in fact lack. It is easy enough 
to predict that these kinds of decisions will have the effect of 
discouraging expert testimony from the very scientists who offer 
their opinions in the most impartial manner. Scientists whose 
primary business is science, not litigation, will be more likely to be 
discouraged from offering expert testimony if by doing so they risk 
damage to their reputation as scientists. However, scientists whose 
primary business is litigation risk no such loss. Where outside 
observers of the litigation process cannot distinguish between 
experts deemed unqualified because they are truly charlatans, and 
experts deemed unqualified because of a technical mismatch 
between their testimony and the facts of the case (as framed by the 
court), a “lemons” problem likely will be the result: bad experts 
will drive out the good.52 As a result, we will be left in a situation 
precisely opposite the one envisioned by the Court in Daubert. 
The post-Daubert disincentives to responsible expert testimony 
exacerbate other developments that also threaten to limit the 
supply of good scientific research, in the courts and elsewhere. 
Experts in litigation have been subjected to intrusive questioning 
even in cases in which they did not testify.53 Scientists who have 
published research showing risks from products and substances 
made by powerful industries have found themselves hounded and 
vilified by those industries and their surrogates.54 In one especially 
extreme, but not unique example, the tobacco industry launched a 
                                                          
52 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
53 See Jon Wiener, Cancer, Chemicals and History, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 
2005, at 19 (discussing how chemical companies issued subpoenas to 
historians—who were not involved in the relevant litigation—who had reviewed 
a book written by an expert hired by plaintiffs in toxic tort case). 
54 See, e.g., DEVRA LEE DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER: TALES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION AND THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION 74-77, 
126-33 (2002) (describing industry efforts to discredit research of scientists 
Mary Amdur and Herbert Needleman). See also Goldie Blumenstyk, The Story 
of Syngenta and Tyrone Hayes at UC Berkeley: The Price of Research, 50 
CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., issue 10, Oct. 31, 2003, at A26 (describing industry 
efforts to discredit work of Tyrone Hayes, showing risks from pesticide 
Atrazine); McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science, supra note 31, at 914-21. 
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massive attack on a Japanese scientist whose research showed a 
link between secondhand smoke and lung cancer.55 
5. Built-in Bias 
The foregoing observations point to another of Daubert’s many 
tensions. The “junk science” movement, which has come to full 
flower in the aftermath of Daubert, was fueled and funded by none 
other than the tobacco industry. In the early 1990s, the tobacco 
industry began to worry that secondhand smoke would be 
classified as a carcinogen, which would in turn support, among 
other things, the growing calls for restrictions on smoking in public 
places. Tobacco industry documents from the early 1990s reveal 
that the industry decided to spin off organizations whose affiliation 
with the tobacco industry would not be clear—that is, groups that 
would attack the scientific basis of research finding risks from 
many different modern hazards, including but by no means limited 
to secondhand smoke.56 By remaining organizationally distant 
from the groups decrying the use of “junk science” in risk 
assessments and by encouraging doubts about the risks of 
substances like alar, asbestos, dioxin, and others in addition to 
secondhand smoke, the tobacco industry could undermine the 
scientific case against secondhand smoke without being directly 
tied to that effort.57 It might well be that the kinds of scientific 
analysis targeted by tobacco industry surrogates are indeed 
scientifically problematic; but, as Daubert’s progeny teach us, the 
fact that an empirical position has originated within the context of 
a legal controversy is some evidence against its reliability.58 
                                                          
55 McGarity, Science in the Regulatory Process, supra note 31, at 172-99. 
56 Elisa K. Ong & Stanton A. Glantz, Constructing “Sound Science” and 
“Good Epidemiology”: Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms, 91 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1749 (Nov. 2001). 
57 Id. See also SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE 
EXPERTS! HOW INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR 
FUTURE 229-244 (Jeremy P. Tarcher, ed. 2002). 
58 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (ruling, on remand from Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, that in 
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6. Overreaching 
Daubert and cases following it have adjusted the substantive 
rules of tort by creating extra obstacles to plaintiffs trying to prove 
their claims. Particularly in toxic tort cases, post-Daubert rulings 
excluding whole categories of evidence—such as animal studies, 
epidemiological studies failing to show a relative risk of greater 
than 2.0, and so forth—have, in essence, raised the substantive bar 
for toxic tort cases.59 And they have done so despite the fact that 
most Daubert issues in federal court arise in diversity cases, in 
which state courts supposedly set the substantive rules of the road. 
If styled, more accurately, as substantive changes to the law of 
torts, federal court rulings raising the substantive bar for toxic tort 
cases would obviously violate the Erie principle, holding that 
federal courts sitting in diversity cases must apply state law on 
matters of substance.60 But because they are, in form, evidentiary 
rulings and not substantive law, federal courts may issue them 
without fear of running afoul of Erie.61 Thus, it appears Daubert 
has worked at least some shift in power away from state courts and 
toward federal courts in matters of substantive tort law. The federal 
courts, however, do not see it that way. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
recently labeled a variant of the Erie argument I have mentioned 
here as “frivolous.”62 
7. False Modesty 
One can also discern, in post-Daubert cases, the subtle revival 
                                                          
decisions on admissibility “one very significant fact to be considered is whether 
the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly 
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether 
they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying”). 
59 See Lucinda Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335 (1999). 
60 Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 305 U.S. 637 (1938). 
61 Id. at 78. 
62 See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 
2005) (citing Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2002); Barron 
v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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of a rather quaint judicial attitude toward the purposes of tort law. 
Faced with the question whether risk assessments used by 
regulatory agencies to estimate the risks posed by hazardous 
substances and activities are relevant to the issue of causation in 
tort cases, some courts have responded by asserting that 
administrative regulation and tort law serve purposes too dissimilar 
to warrant consideration of regulatory decisions in tort cases. Here 
is a typical example of the kind of reasoning these courts employ: 
[A] regulatory standard, rather than being a measure of 
causation, is a public-health exposure level that an agency 
determines pursuant to statutory standards set by Congress 
. . . . [A] regulator’s purpose is to “suggest or make 
prophylactic rules governing human exposure . . . from the 
preventive perspective that agencies adopt in order to 
reduce public exposure to harmful substances.”63 
Completely overlooked is the possibility that courts in tort cases 
could also take a “preventive” perspective, and the reality that 
whatever perspective courts take in this regard, their choice reflects 
not just “causation” as a strictly factual matter but also policy 
considerations about how to allocate the burden of scientific 
uncertainty between plaintiffs and defendants.64 As Professor 
Richard Pierce stated, the legal question in toxic tort cases is not 
simply: “Did substance A cause injury X?,” but rather: “Is there 
evidence that substance A causes injury X that is sufficient to 
justify taking some action with respect to substance A and those 
firms who are responsible for substance A?”65 To pretend, as some 
courts have, that “causation” in the legal world is solely a matter of 
fact, rather than a matter of fact intermingled with questions of 
policy, is to embrace a naïve and outmoded view of the role of 
                                                          
63 Sutera v. The Perrier Group Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 664 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(quoting Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also 
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1249 (11th Cir. 2005); Wright 
v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996). 
64 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of 
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 791-95 (1997). 
65 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic 
Torts, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1307, 1307 (1998). 
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common-law courts in shaping public policy. 
8. Codifying Science 
In Joiner, the Supreme Court held that the abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review governs appellate review of district courts’ 
evidentiary rulings under Daubert. The Court distinguished 
Daubert findings from the kinds of factual issues that, on a motion 
for summary judgment, are to be decided in favor of the non-
moving party (in Daubert cases, this is usually the plaintiff).66 
Thus, the Court thinks Daubert issues aren’t standard factual 
issues; however, they must not be conventional legal issues, either, 
since in that case the standard for evaluating district courts’ 
judgments about them would be de novo review.67 
Frequently, however, courts have treated prior rulings on the 
admissibility of specific evidence as legally binding precedent. For 
example, in Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., the Fifth 
Circuit cited a prior legal decision for the proposition that 
epidemiological evidence on some kinds of cancer was not 
probative with respect to the causation of brain cancer and it also 
cited a prior case for the idea that animal studies were not reliable 
indicators of risks to humans.68 In the latter instance, the court 
cited a prior decision as precedent even though the prior case was 
about a different allegedly harmful drug and involved different 
tests in animals.69 This is not only another example of a court 
adopting unscientific principles in the name of Daubert; no 
scientific principle countenances rejecting animal studies across 
the board, without reference to specific details from the specific 
context in question. It is also an example of a court turning the 
supposedly discretionary issues raised by Daubert into issues 
answerable through general legal rules about particular kinds of 
evidence.70 
                                                          
66 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997). 
67 See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 588 (1988). 
68 102 F.3d 194, 197 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1996). 
69 Id. at 197. 
70 See also Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1030 
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It is easy enough to understand the temptation to give 
precedential legal effect to prior rulings on the admissibility of 
expert evidence. One of the potential embarrassments of Joiner’s 
abuse of discretion standard is the possibility of apparently 
inconsistent evidentiary judgments among courts. Since one 
consequence of this lenient standard of review is that district 
judges may come to different conclusions on the same evidence, it 
may be that different judges could find, for example, that expert 
evidence concluding that PCBs cause lung cancer is both reliable 
and unreliable. It doesn’t take much of a step from there to 
announce that courts have concluded that PCBs both cause and do 
not cause cancer. When the issue is one of general causation—
whether PCBs could cause cancer to someone—this apparent 
inconsistency in the legal treatment of the same phenomenon could 
cause discomfort.71 How could it be, one might ask, that PCBs 
could cause cancer in some courts or jurisdictions but not in 
others? One obvious answer is that individual judges have different 
perspectives on the reliability of evidence of the carcinogenic 
potential of PCBs. Another answer is that some plaintiffs might 
have better lawyers, or more seasoned or credible experts, than 
others. Neither answer will be comforting to people who maintain 
that American justice is meted out in a neutral way, without regard 
to the personal predilections of judges or the wealth and resources 
of individual litigants. One can imagine, therefore, the (perhaps 
unconscious) desire of judges to tidy up this mess by applying 
stare decisis principles to evidentiary rulings. Yet, it is hard to 
square this application of stare decisis with Joiner’s implicit 
insistence that Daubert issues are not purely legal issues. 
9. Mixed Signals 
Even while they give precedential effect to prior evidentiary 
rulings under Daubert, courts also claim to be preserving parties’ 
                                                          
(E.D. Mo. 2000); Cuevas v. EI DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F.3d 1306, 
1309-11 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
71 See David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under 
Daubert, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 976-78 (1997). 
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rights to jury trials and claim not to be expanding the concept of 
issue preclusion. For example, in In re TMI Litigation, the Third 
Circuit refused to apply its ruling on expert testimony to plaintiffs 
in a different class from the plaintiffs offering the expert testimony 
in question.72 The court thought that doing so would endanger the 
other plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial and would improperly enlarge 
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion.73 Yet if 
courts use prior evidentiary rulings as binding precedents in future 
cases, the only difference between that and the position rejected in 
In re TMI Litigation is that it will take more time to reach what is 
in any event a preordained conclusion on admissibility. 
* *  * 
What is to be done about the mess that has followed in the 
wake of Daubert? There are several possibilities, ranging from the 
modest to the more adventurous. 
The most modest response to the shortcomings of Daubert 
would be to refrain from embracing a proposal to extend the ruling 
to other settings, such as judicial review of agencies’ expert 
decisions.74 So far, at least, courts have not seemed overly anxious 
to take up suggestions to this effect.75 
Another possibility would be for the Supreme Court to begin to 
mend the damage it has done in the same way it did the damage in 
the first place: by modeling for lower courts the kind of analysis 
they should be undertaking in rendering judgments on 
admissibility after Daubert. Only in this case, the idea would be 
for the Court to model an analysis that gave expression to 
Daubert’s stated goal of liberalizing decisions on admissibility, did 
                                                          
72 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999). 
73 Id. at 725-26. See also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 
941, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1990). 
74 For such a proposal, see Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, 
“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency 
Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003). 
75 See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that Daubert is not, “strictly speaking,” applicable to proceedings 
before administrative agencies, but the “spirit of Daubert” applies to them). 
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not embrace junk science, did not mischaracterize the nature of the 
decision at hand, and so forth. More than any doctrinal change the 
Court could make, such a modeling exercise would send a 
significantly different signal to the lower courts that have become 
emboldened, after Daubert and Joiner, to exclude a good deal of 
evidence as unreliable.76 
Other, more radical possibilities would entail adjusting the 
substantive rules of tort so as to avoid the factual conundrums 
revealed by Daubert. Professors Margaret Berger and Wendy 
Wagner have separately proposed, for example, that if a defendant 
failed to do studies on the potential harms of a product the 
defendant placed on the market, then the defendant should be 
liable based on its failure to develop and disclose information on 
harmfulness.77 This proposal would shift attention away from 
causation and toward the creation of incentives to produce 
information about health effects of products. 
Another possibility, which I have advocated, is to recognize 
that the knowing imposition of risk on one human by another is a 
tort sounding in dignity, the closest cousins of which are the torts 
of assault, battery, and trespass.78 This approach would allow 
courts to avoid the numbingly complex scientific questions that 
Daubert has asked them to manage and would refocus their 
attention on the motivations and dignitary consequences of human 
actions—subjects that are familiar and congenial to law, and that 
Daubert has relegated to the sidelines in its singular fixation on 
scientific expertise. 
 
                                                          
76 See Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 391 F.3d 1267, 1269 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 622 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. Potts, 
996 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1998). But see Lobsters, Inc. v. Evans, 346 F. 
Supp.2d 340, 344 (D. Mass. 2004) (stating that although Daubert was 
technically inapplicable to the admissibility of evidence before an administrative 
law judge, the “spirit of Daubert” applied) (quoting Naim, 354 F.2d at 660). 
77 Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a 
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); 
Wagner, supra note 64. 
78 Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL. REV. 67 (2001). 
